The paper is devoted to the problem of interpretation of the exclusive right that, contrary to being consolidated as a single category, is formulated differently in relation to different objects of intellectual rights; the powers allocated therein, which constitute (although not exhaustively) its content, also do not coincide in different results of intellectual activity and means of individualization. The use of the teleological interpretation method allows the authors to examine the exclusive right both in the context of the “conflicting right” and the “right to cooperate”, both in statics and in dynamics of legal relations. The purposes for which the exclusive right is normatively formulated are to determine: the rights of a person to his own actions, actions constituting an offense, the subject matter of the contract on granting the right to use the result of intellectual activity and means of individualization. These main objectives may contain additional ones, such as determining the scope of the offence. The normative design of the content of the exclusive right is multilayered and multi-variant, but external contradictions are removed due to teleological interpretation that takes into account the purposes of the legal regulation.