The paper examines Russia’s retaliatory measures in regulating foreign trade in goods. Specific examples of the introduction of increased rates of import customs duties and the suspension of tariff preferences are analyzed. The grounds for denial of most-favored-nation treatment declared by the Russian side in accordance with the provisions of the World Trade Organization law are examined. A comparison is made of the countermeasures under the legislation of the Russian Federation on foreign trade activities with the countermeasures under the law of the Eurasian Economic Union. The competence of the Eurasian Economic Commission in the area of taking countermeasures under individual international treaties is disclosed. Contradictions and inconsistencies in the regulation of countermeasures by the Treaty on the Union are demonstrated. Conclusions are formulated about the similarity of countermeasures with Russian special economic measures and measures of influence (counteraction), about the practical advantages of the reasons and grounds for introducing countermeasures under Russian legislation over the referral norms of the law of the Eurasian Economic Union. A reasonable division of retaliatory measures into supranational ones, provided for by international trade agreements, and retaliatory measures introduced in accordance with Russian legislation is proposed.