Labor Inspections in Post-Soviet States: Degradation for the Sake of the Myth about Economic Efficiency?

Abstract

The paper discusses the policy to limit the powers and resources allocated to labor inspectorates in 10 post-Soviet states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine). This policy is carried out under the slogans of protecting businesses from excessive regulatory burden and attracting investment. The aim of the study is to determine the extent of restrictions and trends in the development of legislation and law enforcement practices of these states in this regard. The objectives of the study are to identify specific limitations enshrined both in regulatory legal acts and in the practical activities of state bodies and non-state structures in these states. The methodology includes both the study of legal acts, and communication with experts in the countries of the region, as well as field surveys involving participants in labor relations and social partners. The study reveals a significant number of restrictions, some of which are in direct conflict with the requirements of the ILO priority conventions on labor inspection. Some, although not in direct contradiction with them, in combination with other restrictions and the specific approach to their application in practice, destroy the efficiency of the working conditions of workers inspection. Among the most important restrictions of labor inspections are: limiting the subject of inspections only to issues of compliance with safety and health standards; establishing in the legislation of a mandatory requirement to warn the employer on the part of the inspection about the inspection being carried out and / or the obligation of the inspection to coordinate the inspection with other state bodies (prosecutors, courts, etc.); establishing the occurrence of workers’ complaints as a prerequisite for the labor inspectorate, etc.