The Constitution of Russia: Stability and Dynamism

The article is devoted to the analysis of the features of the Russian Federation Constitution that ensure stability and constructive development of this fundamental act. It is emphasized that these particular characteristics directly affect the state of sociopolitical reality, since modern constitutions are nothing more than a political and legal mechanism, the effective functioning of which determines sustainability of sovereign social systems and their progress in a rapidly changing world. Particular attention is paid to demonstrating the historical conditionality and functional effectiveness of "internal inconsistency" of the Russian Constitution of 1993. The paper explains philosophical, political, legal and practical significance of the constitutional recognition of equal social value of formally competing principles and ideas. It is noted that the model of the Constitution of the Russian Federation should be considered as one of the most effective, since the average "life span" of democratic constitutions adopted during the period 1789-2005 is about 17 years, while in 2018 we are celebrating a quarter century of the Basic Law of our State.

Constitution, constitutional law, Constitutional Court, president, politics, law, Russian Federation, social order, socio-political stability, social development

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