Protection of Scientifi c Research Results and Scientifi c Information in Elite Sports ("Formula 1" Case Study)

The paper examines the legal regulation of scientific research in professional sports as in the case of Formula 1. It is emphasized that the owner of the rights to the results of scientific research can be not only the racing team itself, but also one of the closely related legal entities. Specific examples are provided demonstrating what can be protected by a patent and who can own intellectual property rights. It is noted that, despite a large number of high-tech solutions, Formula 1 teams often deliberately refuse to patent. An analysis of the situation in this sport shows that in the conditions of constant changes and improvements in racing cars, obtaining a patent is unjustified due to the length of this procedure. At the same time, the results of scientific research and scientific information are protected by the trade secret regime. It is stipulated that such a regime is accompanied by the risk of disclosure of confidential information by persons, primarily current and former employees. One of the biggest spy scandals in the history of Formula 1 is cited as an illustration. Particular attention is given to the problem of the transfer of staff members from one Formula 1 team to another, including the delineation of the employee’s own skills and the protected information obtained by him in previous work. In addition, it is emphasized that such transitions are often accompanied by compulsory leave without the right to go to a new job, so that the existing knowledge about the work of the former employer loses its relevance. It is also noted that the trade secret regime does not prevent Formula 1 teams from getting acquainted with the results of scientific research of their competitors due to the rules on the maximum openness of cars during the Grand Prix. Specific examples of borrowing by racing teams of successful engineering solutions of rivals by creating their own analogues are given.

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