The Category of Human Dignity in U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on the Right to Die

The paper analyzes the interpretation of the category of human dignity in the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in cases related to the right to die. It seeks to identify the conceptual foundations on which the court builds its reasoning in cases involving the termination of life-sustaining treatment and medical assistance in suicide, as well as to assess the balance between personal autonomy and state interests. Particular attention is given to the analysis of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, Washington v. Glucksberg, and Vacco v. Quill, in which the court articulates key positions on this issue. The analysis reveals that the court consistently refuses to recognize the right to die as constitutional, preferring to delegate such matters to state legislation. In this context, human dignity is interpreted by the Court not as an autonomous legal principle, but as a derivative of other constitutional guarantees — primarily the right to privacy. It is emphasized that the Court’s approach to the right to die is rooted in institutional restraint and respect for pluralistic conceptions of dignity, reflecting a fundamental tension between personal autonomy and collective values in liberal democracy. The findings and conclusions of this study can be used to advance the human rights doctrine in the field of the right to die. The novelty of the study lies in its analysis of the category of dignity within the framework of U.S. constitutional law, based on the Court’s judicial practice.